Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War by Nakao, Keisuke
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front
War
Nakao, Keisuke
15 May 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100426/
MPRA Paper No. 100426, posted 17 May 2020 12:41 UTC
Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War
Keisuke Nakaoy
April 28, 2020
Abstract
By extending the extant costly-lottery models of war to three-party bar-
gaining scenarios, we o¤er rationalist explanations for two-front war, where a
state at the center is fought by two enemies at opposing peripheries. We found
that even though private information exists only in one front, war can break out
in both fronts. Because the war outcome in one front can a¤ect the outcome in
the other through the shift of military balance, the central state may preemp-
tively initiate war in one front to establish its preponderance in the other (e.g.,
World War I), or a peripheral state may preventively join the war waging in the
other front to leverage its power (e.g., Napoleonic Wars). These ndings echo
Waltzs neorealism concern that a multi-polar system may not be so stable as
the bipolar system that bargaining models of dyadic war commonly presume.
(JEL: C78; D74; F51)
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1 Introduction
Presumably due to di¢culties with modeling multilateral interactions across states
(Jackson and Morelli 2011), formal theorists in international relations have developed
few models of multilateral war (for an exception, Krainin and Wiseman 2016), while
they have devoted much more e¤orts to modeling dyadic war (Fearon 1995; Powell
2004; Slantchev 2003a, 2003b; Smith 1998; Smith and Stam 2004; Wagner 2000). To
model war fought by multiple parties, further simplication need to be undertaken.
One approach to such simplication is to focus on a particular form of war such
as war fought by one against N parties, as often found in rebellions and revolutions
(Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988; Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Fearon 2011; Ginkel and
Smith 1999; Nakao 2015, 2018; Roemer 1985; Weingast 1995), or war intervened by a
third party (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Gartner and Siverson 1996; Powell
2017; Smith 1996). In this article, we explore a particular form of wartwo-front
war, where a state at the center is fought by two enemies at opposing peripheries.1
Possibly due to its geographic nature, two-front wars were repeatedly experienced in
Europe, which is stretched along with major powers in a rowfrom Spain, France,
and Germany to Russia. If two peripheral states are strongly committed to a prewar
alliance, they could be treated as a single actor, and two-front war reduced to dyadic
war (e.g., Arab states in the Palestine War), but such an alliance is not necessarily
formed.2 We thus develop a theory of two-front war, which is built upon costly-lottery
models with ultimatum games. Major two-front wars in history are listed in Table
1.3
In modeling two-front war, we illuminate two causal mechanisms of triadic war,
which cannot be captured by the extant models of dyadic war. In a mechanism, a
peripheral state plays a critical role in spreading war from one theater to the other.
In the other mechanism, the central state initiates war against either peripheral state,
followed by the outbreak of war in the other theater. While the former mechanism
resembles the Napoleonic Wars, where Russia challenged the French hegemony by
bandwagoning on the uprising in the Iberian Peninsula, the latter might better
1At the tactical level, simultaneous attacks on the enemys anks from the two opposing sides
are called the Hammer and Anvil.
2A static model of alliance formation among three players with complete information has been
developed by Krainin (2014).
3Among the wars in Table 1, those won by the central belligerents are the Palestine War, the
Six-Day War, the War of the League of Cognac with the Siege of Vienna.
Belligerents Position West Center East
First Congo War
1996-1997
Angola Zaire
Uganda,
Rwanda,
& Burundi
Yom Kippur War
1973 Egypt Israel Syria
Six-Day War
1967
Egypt Israel
Syria
& Jordan
Palestine War,
1947-1949
Egypt Israel
Lebanon,
Syria, &
Transjordan,
World Wars II
1939-1945
France,
Britain,
& U.S.
Germany
& Austria
Russia
World Wars I
1914-1918
France,
Britain,
& U.S.
Germany
& Austria
Russia
Napoleonic Wars
1807-1814
Portugal
& Spain
France
Sweden,
Russia,
& Prussia
War of the League
of Cognac with
Siege of Vienna
1526-1530
France
Holy Roman
Empire
Ottoman
Empire
Table 1: Major two-front wars in history.
capture World War I, where Germany declared war against France in hope to shatter
it before Russia was ready to ght. These mechanisms are missing in the extant
costly-lottery models in that unlike them, our models allow the military balance to
shift endogenously, as a result of the interplay among the three states.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 o¤ers a benchmark model of
bargaining and ghting among three states. Sections 3 and 4 present costly-lottery
models of two-front war, which are compared in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes our
theoretical ndings. All the proofs appear in Appendix.
Front West East
Belligerents (; ) (; )
Probabilities of winning (p; p) (q; q)
Value of issue U V
Costs of ghting (c; c) (d; d)
Table 2: Parameters for the two fronts.
2 Benchmark Model of Two-Front Bargaining
To illuminate the causes of two-front wara war between a party at the center and two
others at opposing peripheries, we develop bargaining models of war, which comprises
two ultimatum games. We begin with a benchmark model, where peace is the unique
equilibrium, and subsequently seek conditions for the outbreak of two-front war.
In the benchmark model, there are three states f; ; g, among which  is located
at the center,  at the western end, and  in the eastern end. In the west,  and
 are in conict over resources with value U > 0. In the east,  and  also have a
dispute about resources valued V > 0. Since  and  are far from contiguous, a war
between them is geographically impossible.
The game proceeds as follows: At the beginning,  chooses its demands  2 [0; U ]
in the west and  2 [0; V ] in the east. In response,  and  simultaneously decide
to accept s proposal or to ght . If  accepts,  gains U   , and  gains . If
 accepts,  gains V   , and  gains . If  ghts,  () wins the entire U with
probability p > 0 (p > 0) such that p + p = 1. If  ghts,  () wins V with
probability q > 0 (q > 0) such that q + q = 1.
Denition 1 Western war refers to the ght between  and . Eastern war refers
to the ght between  and . Two-front war refers to the combination of both the
western and eastern wars simultaneously prosecuted by .
Given  and s costs of ghting c > 0 and c > 0, their ex ante payo¤s from
ghting the western war are pU   c > 0 and pU   c > 0, respectively. Given
 and s costs of ghting d > 0 and d > 0, their ex ante payo¤s from ghting
the eastern war are qV   d > 0 and qV   d > 0, respectively. In the game as a
whole, s payo¤ equals the sum of the payo¤s it gains from the two fronts.4 The key
parameters are summarized in Table 2.
4For instance, if  accepts  in the west and  ghts in the east, s ex ante payo¤ will be
U    + qV   d.
If the bargaining outcomes in the two fronts do not inuence each other as pre-
sumed above, war never emerges in equilibrium:
Lemma 1 In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model,
war never breaks out in either front; i.e.,  o¤ers
 = pU   c
 = qV   d;
both of which are accepted by  and , respectively.
As in the dyadic bargaining situation (Fearon 1995), the outbreak of two-front
war is a puzzle even in the triadic bargaining situationgiven a war is costly, there
always exists a peaceful settlement that is Pareto superior to war.
Figure 1: Two-front war with preventive ght.
3 Model I: Reactive, Preventive Fight
By extending the benchmark model, we next seek the conditions with which two-
front war can break out. Two-front war can trivially arise from private information
(or commitment problems) in both the fronts. However, we demonstrate that two-
front war can break out despite private information only in one front.
The next model, labeled Model I, di¤ers from the benchmark model in a threefold
manner: (i)  has private information on its own cost c; (ii) a time lag exists in
bargaining and ghting between the two fronts; (iii) the war outcome in the west can
a¤ect the military balance in the east. This endogenous shift of the military balance
is missing in extant bargaining models of dyadic war and forms our models novelty.
The extensive form of Model I appears in Figure 1.
As to (i), when placing the o¤er ,  does not know the true value of c, but it
still knows the cumulative distribution F (c) and density f (c) with non-decreasing
hazard rate f (c) = (1  F (c)) (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991: 267). As to (ii), an
ultimatum game in the west is played earlier than in the east. Thus the western
war can begin before bargaining in the east takes place. However,  has the chance
to ght  before the western war ends. As to (iii), if  wins in the west, it could
reallocate all its forces to the east, so that the probability that  wins in the east
increases from q to q
0
 > 0. Conversely, if  wins in the west,  would lose a part
of its military resources prepared for the east, so that the probability that  wins
decreases to q00 > 0 such that q
00
 < q < q
0
 with q
0
 + q
0
 = 1, and q
00
 + q
00
 = 1, where
q0 > 0 (q
00
 > 0) denotes the probability that  wins in the east if  wins (loses) in
the west.5
In this game, the asymmetry of information between  and  can cause the war
in the west, which may, in turn, induce  to preventively ght  in the east. If the
war outcome in the west is likely to produce a disadvantageous military imbalance in
the east, tacitly allied with would ght  in the east before the western war
ends.
Proposition 1 In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Model I, two-front
war can break out if
f (0) <
1
c
(1)
pq
0
 + pq
00
 < q; (2)
i.e.,  ghts  in the west with a positive probability if Inequality (1) holds; conditional
on s ght in the west,  ghts  in the east if Inequality (2) holds.
The strategy prole of the equilibrium appears in Lemma 2 of Appendix. In the
west,  ghts with probability F

pU   
y


, where y is s equilibrium o¤er to .
Inequality (1) guarantees that this probability is positive. As with other costly-lottery
models with private information (Fearon 1995), in choosing ,  weighs the balance
between the terms of peaceful agreement and the risk of war.
In the east,  chooses to ght instead of refrain immediately after s ght if
Inequality (2) holdsit ghts, because pincer attacks jointly with  would give  a
better prospect of war if  has di¢culties in maintaining two battlefronts simultane-
ously. In other words,  jumps on s ght in the west, since a delay in ght would
leave  in isolation. On the other hand, if Inequality (2) is violated, the alliance
with  would not be so helpful for s prosecution of war, and thus  would refrain
from ghting before it bargains with . Inequality (2) holds with a large q, large
5The shift of military balance in the east can be formally explained as follows: With Tullocks
(1980) contest success function, the probability of s winning can be shown as: p =
(m)
P
(m)
P+(m)
P
in the west and q =
(n)
Q
(n)
Q+(n)
Q in the east, where mi > 0 (ni > 0) is is strength in the west
(east) with i 2 f; ; g, P  1, and Q  1. If  wins in the west,  can deploy all its forces in the
east, so that the probability of s winning in the east increases: q0 =
(m+n)
Q
(m+n)
Q+(n)
Q . If  loses,
it loses a part of its resources, so that q00 =
(n00)
Q
(n00)
Q+(n)
Q with n
00
  n.
p, and small q
0
, implying that a preventive war in the east is likely if  is a great
help for  (with a large q), or if s defeat in the west (with a large p) signicantly
disadvantages  in the east (with a small q0).
In particular, if a uniform distribution is presumed (i.e., c  U [0; c]), the result
is much simplied:
Corollary 1 Given F (c) =
c
c
with c 2 (c; c + 2pU), two-front war breaks out
with probability 1
2
  c
2c
if Inequality (2) holds.
The restriction that c 2 (c; c + 2pU) satises Inequality (1), guaranteeing
that s equilibrium o¤er to  is interior, or y 2 (0; pU). With this distribution,
s o¤er to  is y = pU  
c c
2
, which is positive by c < c + 2pU . The western
war breaks out with probability F

pU   
y


= 1
2
  c
2c
, which is positive by c > c.
By Inequality (2), the eastern war also breaks out, conditional on the western wars
outbreak.
Figure 2: Two-front war with preemptive ght.
4 Model II: Proactive, Preemptive Fight
The last model, labeled Model II, delineates the other cause and pattern of two-front
war. It di¤ers from Model I in a threefold manner: (i) instead of ,  has private
information on its cost d, so that  only knows that d follows the cumulative distri-
bution G (d) and density g (d) with non-decreasing hazard rate g (d) = (1 G (d));
(ii) unlike Model I,  cannot ght  immediately after s ght due to geographic con-
straints, time for s mobilization, or other obstacles; (iii) the western war decisively
ends before bargaining in the east begins with probability  > 0 and is indecisively
protracted with probability 1   . If the western war is protracted, it will end only
after  decides whether to ght or not.
To elaborate on (iii), if  ghts in the west,  () immediately wins with probabil-
ity p (p) before bargaining in the east begins, Furthermore, as the war outcome
in the west can a¤ect the military balance in the east (for the same reasons as in
Model I), if  ghts and immediately wins (loses) in the west, the probability that 
wins in the east changes to q0 > 0 (q
00
 > 0) such that q
00
 < q < q
0
. If the western war
is protracted, the military balance in the east is una¤ected, so that the probability
that  wins remains q. The extensive form of Model II is shown in Figure 2.
In this game,  may induce s ght in the west to improve its bargaining position
in the east, whereas the eastern war can be caused by the asymmetry of information
between  and .
Proposition 2 In any subgame perfect Nash equilibria of Model II, two-front war
can break out if
c + c

< 	 (3)
g (0) <
1
d
; (4)
where
	 
X
q2fq ;q0 ;q00g
p (q)
 
G (qV    (q)) ((1  q)V   d)
+ (1 G (qV    (q))) ((V    (q)))
!
(5)
with
p (q) =
8><>:
 1 if q = q
p if q = q
0

p if q = q
00

 (q) =
(
0 if g(qV )
1 G(qV )
 1
qV+db otherwise
such that
g

qV   b
1 G

qV   b =
1
qV + d   b ;
i.e.,  ghts  in the west if Inequality (3) holds;  ghts  in the east with a positive
probability if Inequality (4) holds.
The strategy prole of the equilibria appears in Lemma 3 of Appendix. There
exist multiple equilibria in Model II due to the exibility of s best-response o¤er to
 (z), which can be any  less than s reservation payo¤, or 
z
 < pU   c. All
other best-response actions are uniquely determined.
In the west,  places an o¤er that is unacceptable to  if Inequality (3) holds.
By placing an unacceptable o¤er,  induces  to ght. Although  is the player
who chooses to ght in the game, it is actually  who in e¤ect triggers the war
preemptively initiates the war, because by defeating , it can invest more military
resources in the eastern front, so that that  can draw more compromise from .
In other words, since it is costly for  to maintain its standing forces in the west,
it would annihilate the threat in the west to deploy more forces in the east (Coe
2012). The standing forces in the west are costly not in the budgetary sense, but
they entail the loss of opportunity to garner more favorable outcomes in the east. On
the other hand, if Inequality (3) is violated,  would place the acceptable o¤er to ,
or z = pU   c, so that the western war would be avoided. Inequality (3) is likely
to hold, or the western war is plausible if the costs of ghting are small for  and
 (with small c and c), and if s decisive victory in the west (with a large p)
generates its military advantage in the east (with a large q0).
In the east, conditional on the western wars outbreak and protraction,  ghts
with probabilityG (qV    (q)), which is positive by Inequality (4). Without know-
ing s cost of ghting d,  would take the risk of war to a reasonable extent for the
sake of favorable terms upon peace.
Although the interpretation of Inequality (3) is di¢cult, it can be simplied by
assuming a uniform distribution of d (i.e., d  V [0; d]):
Corollary 2 Given G (d) =
d
d
with d 2
 
d; d + 2q
0
V

, two-front war breaks out
with probability (1  )

1
2
  d
2d

if
q +
c + c
V
< pq
0
 + pq
00
: (6)
With this distribution, Inequality (3)the condition for s ght in the west
can be reduced to Inequality (6). By the restriction d 2
 
d; d + 2q
0
V

, the eastern
war can break out, or Inequality (4) holds. In the east, s o¤er to  is  (q) =
qV   d d
2
, which depends on q 2

q; q
0
; q
00

	
but is always positive by d < d+2q
0
V .
Regardless of the subgames with q 2

q; q
0
; q
00

	
, the probability of the eastern war
is G
 
qV   z

= 1
2
  d
2d
, which is also positive by d > d.
5 Comparison
The assumption of the uniform distributions enables the comparison of the conditions
for two-front war between Models I and II. In either model, it is presumed that the
central state () is the proposer of o¤ers, while the peripheral states ( and ) the
receivers. As shown below, this proposer-receiver relationship in the bargaining pro-
tocol a¤ects the condition for two-front wars outbreak. Because the models are built
upon ultimatum games, the proposer possesses the full bargaining power, whereas the
receivers have no such power. Consequently, the proposer can grab the entire surplus
(e.g., c + c in the west) upon peace by settling with its most preferred outcome in
the bargaining range; in contrast, the receivers cannot gain any surplus. Those say,
the distribution of bargaining power, determined by the bargaining protocol, gener-
ates di¤erent incentives to ght between the proposer and the receiversin provoking
war, the proposer must abandon the surplus from peace that the receivers would not
entertain regardless of their decisions. Therefore, the condition on the proposers
incentive to ght should be more restrictive than on the receivers.
In Model I with the uniform distribution, the expansion of war from the west to
the east hinges on s incentive to ght. That is,  decides to join the eastern war if
Inequality (2) holds, or equivalently if
q < pq
0
 + pq
00
:
Because  is the receiver in the east, no surplus can a¤ect its decision, and thus only
the shift of the military balance matters for the expansion. That means,  decides
to ght without delay if its expected payo¤ from ghting immediately exceeds the
reservation payo¤ from ghting in the future. If the western war is likely to result
in s disadvantage,  would preventively ght  in the east before the western war
ends, leading to wars waged simultaneously in both the fronts.
In Model II with the uniform distribution, on the other hand, the outbreak of
two-front war hinges on s incentive to ght in the west, or  decides to ght  if
q +
c + c
V
< pq
0
 + pq
00
;
as shown in Inequality (6). As the proposer,  must incorporate the loss of surplus in
its decision calculus. Thus, unlike Inequality (2) of Model I, this condition contains
an additional term
c+c
V
, which makes  more hesitant to ght, because it must
abandon the surplus when it ghts. The condition also shows that  is more likely
to ght in the west if if the eastern war is more likely to end decisively (with a large
) and also if the issue at stake is more valuable in the east (with a large V ).
The comparison between Models I and II reveals that whether wars are waged in
both the fronts depends on which party (proposer or receivers) plays the pivotal role
among the three states. Although the two models depict di¤erent channels to wars,
the key mechanism is in commontwo-front war is a result of the interplay among
three states in light of the shifting military balance. While the peripheral states (
in Model I) strive to prevent the rise of hegemony, the central state ( in Model II)
aspires to establish its preponderance. Unlike extant costly-lottery models, our model
elucidates the shift as a product of bargaining and ghting in another area.
Model Model I Model II
Private information Cost c in the west Cost d in the east
Pivotal state Receiver  in periphery Proposer  at center
Bargaining power
of the pivotal state
No power held
by receiver 
Full power held
by proposer 
Timing of the
pivotal decision
Reactive
(after the western war)
Proactive
(before the eastern war)
Motive as to the
military balance
Prevention of
isolation
Preemption for
preponderance
Exemplary war Napoleonic Wars World War I
Table 3: Comparison of the implications between the two models.
6 Conclusion
By extending the extant costly-lottery models of dyadic war (Fearon 1995), we have
developed a theory of two-front war, where a state at the center is fought by two
enemies at opposing peripheries. Since bargaining and ghting in one front can a¤ect
the military balance in the other, war can spread from one front to the other. By
analyzing two models of combined ultimatum games, we have uncovered two channels
through which war can break out and expand.
In one of the two models, labeled Model I, war is originally caused by private
information in the west. Because this war could change the military balance in the
east, the peripheral state in the east would join the war before it ends, leading to
the expansion of war waged in both the fronts. The eastern states bandwagoning
is regarded as both reactive and preventiveit is reactive in that the state ghts
after the western war beginsand also preventive in that the state ghts before the
military disadvantage materializes upon itself.
This pattern can be found in the Napoleonic Wars. During the closing phases of
the Wars, Portugal refused Napoleons Continental Blockage in 1807, leading to the
Peninsular War in the West from 1808. As France was troubled over the Spanish
resistance in the Peninsular, Russia provoked its challenge to France in 1810 (Haldi
2003). Russia and other following states in the East presumably leveraged their
military power by exploiting the Iberian resistance (Ellis 2003).
In the equilibrium of the other model, or Model II, war is initiated by the central
state toward the west. The western state is targeted due to the time lag for mobi-
lization between the two peripheral statesthe eastern state needs a longer time to
deploy its forces on its border than the western state. That means, the central state
intends to defeat the western enemy shortly and decisively before the eastern state
is ready to ght. The central states decision to initiate war is both proactive and
preemptiveit is proactive in that the decision is made before ghting begins in the
eastand also preemptive in that it gives no room for negotiation in the west. In
other words, the central state seeks its preponderance, or military superiority, in the
east by forestalling its enemies. By disallowing a defacto coalition by the peripheral
states, the central state could avoid the simultaneous ghts in both the fronts. How-
ever, the failure to swiftly defeat the western state would drag the central state into
the devastating scenario of two-front war.
World War I resembles this pattern. Long before the Wars onset, Germany
adopted the Schlie¤en Plan in 1905, which was based on the presumption that due
to geographic, technological, and other constraints, Russia needed at least six weeks
to overrun the eastern approaches of Berlin. Within the six weeksaccording to
the PlanGermany could shatter the French forces by introducing the vast majority
of its army, and after the French defeat, Germany would swiftly relocate its entire
army to counter the Russian forces in the East. In other words, the Plan was to
decouple the combat between the two fronts. However, the War did not proceed, as
Germany planned. Possible causes of the German failure in the West were the Belgian
tenacious scorched-earth resistance, the stretched supply lines to the German troops,
and the loss of quantitative military advantage (Creveld 2004; Keegan 1998; Winter
1989). Moreover, Russia enabled its army to take a quicker o¤ensive by shortcutting
its mobilization timeline (Cashman and Robinson 2007: 38), putting Germany into
the position of simultaneously maintaining both the fronts. The Plan was dismissed
after the First Battle of Marne, where Germany halted and withdrew its forces.
Although the two models portray di¤erent channels, they share the common
factorthe timing of ght. The timing can matter, because it a¤ects the relative
strength between the central and peripheral states. While the peripheral states pursue
the simultaneous confrontation against the central state, the central state attempts
to disallow such coordination by dealing with them sequentially or separately. In this
sense, the states might disagree not only about the division of benets, but also the
timings of ghts across the fronts. War could be waged in two fronts simultaneously
if the central state fails to keep its adversaries in isolation. The complexity caused
by geography, the timing of ght, and the shift of balance among more states may
raise the risk of war, echoing Waltzs (1979) neorealism concern that peace is more
di¢cult in a multipolar world than in a bipolar world that dyadic models commonly
presume.
Moreover, our models indicate that the likelihood of two-front war hinges on the
distribution of bargaining power across states. A state with more bargaining power
is less prone to ght, because it must abandon greater surplus once bargaining fails.
Therefore, if the central state possesses more bargaining power than the peripheral
counterparts, as presumed in our models, two-front war of the Napoleonic-Wars type
should be more likely, common, or frequent than those of the WWI type, posing an
empirical question. The comparison between Models I and II is summarized in Table
3.
Finally, we close the discussion by suggesting several agendas for future research.
The models we have developed in this article are presumably the simplest possible
formal descriptions of two-front war. While focusing on the timing of ght and the
shift of military balance, the models assumed away other important elements that
may a¤ect the form of war such as the forth and other states, arms races, geography,
and duration. Richer implications could be garnered by incorporating some of these
elements. Thus one of the possible extensions would be to include more states which
may seek an alliance, bargain, and ght multilaterally (Krainin and Wiseman 2016),
although such an extension would be theoretically di¢cult (Jackson andMorelli 2011).
Two-front war can be categorized as a particular form of multilateral war. Arms
races can also be an important element that is missing in our models. Especially,
the central state must engage not only in production, but also in the allocation
and reallocation of its forces between two fronts, as war evolves. Another extension
would be to lay out the geographic distances across states in a more explicit manner,
as found in random-walk models (Slantchev 2003b; Smith 1998; Smith and Stam
2003, 2004). In addition, the costly-lottery models presented in the article are an
illustration of war more parsimonious than the costly-process models (Reiter 2003).
It would thus be meaningful to delineate the entire process of war from its onset
toward the termination, as was done by some theorists of dyadic war (Powell 2004;
Slantchev 2003a; Wagner 2000). Modelling of multilateral war should have a spacious
room for further research.
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APPENDIX
The following claim applies to all three models.
Claim 1 (a) With complete information on c and d,  o¤ers
 (p) = pU   c (7)
 (q) = qV   d; (8)
where p 2

p; p
0
; p
00

	
and q 2

q; q
0
; q
00

	
are the probabilities that  wins and that
 wins, respectively; (b) with incomplete information,  o¤ers
 (p) =
8><>:
0 if f(pU)
1 F (pU)
 1
pU+c
pU if f (0)  1
cb otherwise (9)
 (q) =
8><>:
0 if g(qV )
1 G(qV )
 1
qV+d
qV if g (0)  1
db otherwise, (10)
where b 2 (0; pU) and b 2 (0; qV ) hold that
f

pU   b
1  F

pU   b =
1
pU + c   b (11)
g

qV   b
1 G

qV   b =
1
qV + d   b ; (12)
(c) whether information is complete or incomplete,  and  respond to  and  by
 (p) =
(
Accept if   pU   c
Fight if  < pU   c
(13)
 (q) =
(
Accept if   qV   d
Fight if  < qV   d:
(14)
Proof of Claim 1. (a,c) With complete information,  accepts  if it is larger
than or equal to the expected payo¤ from ghting, or  chooses  (p) in Equation
(13). Expecting this  (p),  chooses the smallest  that is acceptable to , or
 (p) in Equation (7). Similarly, the best responses in the east are  (q) and  (q)
in Equations (8, 14).
(b,c) With incomplete information, given  (p) in Equation (13),  determines
 2 [0; pU ] to maximize its expected payo¤:
max

F (pU   ) (pU   c) + (1  F (pU   )) (U   ) ;
where F (pU   ) is the probability that  ghts. The derivative of the objective is:
 1  f (pU   ) ( pU   c + ) + F (pU   ) ;
which is positive if
f (pU   )
1  F (pU   )
>
1
pU + c   
:
Since the left-hand side is non-increasing in  and the right-hand side is strictly
increasing for  < pU ,  (p) = 0 if
f(pU)
1 F (pU)
 1
pU+c
;  (p) = pU if f (0) 
1
c
;
otherwise,  (p) = b (p). Equivalently,  (p) is as in Equation (9). Similarly, given
 (q) in Equation (14),  (q) can be derived as in Equation (10).
Let an asterisk (*) denote the best-response actions in the baseline model.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is immediate from Claim 1-(a,c); s strategy is
 =  (p) in Equation (7) and 

 =  (q) in Equation (8); s strategy 

 =
 (p) in Equation (13); and s 

 =  (q) in Equation (14).
Let a dagger (y) denote the best-response actions in Model I.
Lemma 2 In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Model I, s strat-
egy is y =  (p) in Equation (9) and
 
y; 
0y
 ; 
00y


=
 
 (q) ; 
 
q0

; 
 
q00

in
Equation (8); s strategy y =  (p) in Equation (13); and s
 
y; 
0y
 ; 
00y


= 
 (q) ; 
 
q0

; 
 
q00

in Equation (14) and
y =
(
Refrain if q  pq
0
 + pq
00

Fight if q > pq
0
 + pq
00
 ;
(15)
where y is s action immediately after  ghts.
Proof of Lemma 2. The model is solved by backward induction. In the subgame
where  accepts s o¤er ,  and s best responses are
 
y; 
y


. Similarly, in the
two subgames where  ghts and  restrains,  and s best responses are:
 
0y ; 
0y


if  wins; and
 
00y ; 
00y


if  wins.
Expecting 0y and 
00y
 ,  decides whether to ght before the western war ends:
y =
(
Refrain if qV   d  p
 
q0V   d

+ p
 
q00V   d

Fight if qV   d > p
 
q0V   d

+ p
 
q00V   d

;
or Equation (15).
Given y,  maximizes its expected payo¤ by choosing 
y
:
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is immediate from Lemma 2. Given y, the
probability of the western war is F

pU   
y


, which is positive if f (0) < 1
c
. The
condition for s ght appears in Equation (15).
Proof of Corollary 1. By Equation (11),
y = pU + c  
1  F

pU   
y


f

pU   
y


= pU + c  
1 
pU 
y

c
1
c
= pU  
c   c
2
;
which is interior, or y 2 (0; pU) by c 2 (c; c + 2pU). Given 
y
, the probability
that  ghts in the west is:
F

pU   
y


=
pU   
y

c
=
pU  

pU  
c c
2

c
=
1
2
 
c
2c
;
which is positive by c > c.
Let a double dagger (z) denote the best-response actions in Model II.
Lemma 3 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Model II, s strategy is
z =
(
pU   c if 	 
c+c

any  < pU   c if 	 >
c+c

;
(16)
where 	 is dened by Equation (5) of Proposition 2, and
 
z; 
0z
 ; 
00z
 ; 
000z


= ( (q) ;

 
q0

; 
 
q00

;  (q)) in Equation (10); s strategy 
z
 =  (p) in Equation (13);
and s
 
z; 
0z
 ; 
00z
 ; 
000z


= ( (q) ; 
 
q0

; 
 
q00

;  (q)) in Equation (14):
Proof of Lemma 3. The equilibrium is derived by backward induction. In the
subgame where  accepts, s best response z. Given 
z
,  chooses 
z
 to maximize its
expected payo¤. In the subgame where  ghts with protraction, the best responses
are the same:
 
000z ; 
000z


=
 
z; 
z


.
Similarly, in the subgame where  ghts and  wins,  and s best responses are 
0z ; 
0z


. Also, in the subgame where  ghts and wins,  and s best responses are 
00z ; 
00z


.
Given z, s expected payo¤ from placing the minimum acceptable o¤er ( =
pU   c) is:
U   (pU   c) +G
 
qV   
z


(qV   d) +
 
1 G
 
qV   
z

  
V   z

;
while s expected payo¤ from placing an unacceptable o¤er (any  < pU   c) is:
pU   c + p
 
G
 
q0V   
0z


(q0V   d) +
 
1 G
 
q0V   
0z

   
V   0z

+p
 
G
 
q00V   
00z


(q00V   d) +
 
1 G
 
q00V   
00z

   
V   00z

+(1  )
 
G
 
qV   
000z


(qV   d) +
 
1 G
 
qV   
000z

   
V   000z

:
By comparing these two payo¤s,  chooses to ght by placing an unacceptable o¤er
if the latter payo¤ is larger, so that z is choosen.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is immediate from Lemma 3. The condition for
s ght appears in Equation (16). Conditional on 000z in the subgame of protraction,
the probability of the eastern war is G
 
qV   
000z


, which is positive if g (0) < 1
d
.
Proof of Corollary 2. By Equation (12), s o¤ers to  are
 
z; 
0z
 ; 
00z
 ; 
000z


= 
z (q) ; 
z

 
q0

; z
 
q00

; z (q)

, where
z (q) = qV  
d   d
2
:
They are all interior by d 2
 
d; d + 2q
0
V

with q0 < q < q
00
 . Regardless of
q 2

q; q
0
; q
00

	
, the probability that  ghts is:
G
 
qV   z (q)

=
qV   z (q)
d
=
qV  

qV   d d
2

d
=
1
2
 
d
2d
: (17)
which is positive by d > d.
By 	 >
c+c

in Equation (16) with Equation (17), the condition for the western
war is summarized as Inequality (5).
